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Abstract
The main contribution of this paper consists in theoretical approximations of the collision
rate of n random identifiers uniformly distributed in m(> n) buckets—along with bounds on
the approximation errors. A secondary contribution is a decentralized anonymization system
of media access control (MAC) addresses with a low collision rate. The main contribution
supports the secondary one in that it quantifies its collision rate, thereby allowing designers
to minimize m while attaining specific collision rates. Recent works in crowd monitoring
based on WiFi probe requests, for which collected MAC addresses should be anonymized,
have inspired this research.
I Introduction
Widely used structures in computer science associate inputs with outputs that are approximately
uniformly distributed in the set of all possible outputs. Hash tables [1, Chap. 11], cryptographic
hash functions and token generators (used for anonymization or security purposes) are examples
of such structures [2, Sec. 9.7.1]. An issue is that these structures may generate collisions, that
is, two different inputs being mapped onto the same output [3, Sec. 9].
The main contribution of this paper is a set of numerically stable estimates of the collision
rate—the average number of collisions divided by the number of inputs—in a hash-based or
token-based system; our estimates assume that the hash function or token generator yields
uniformly distributed outputs. We also derive bounds on the error of these estimates.
The main contribution supports our secondary one, a decentralized anonymization procedure
for media access control (MAC) addresses. Specifically, our main contribution quantifies the
collision rate of our secondary one, thereby making it possible to tune the parameters of the
anonymization procedure so as to attain arbitrarily small collision rates (at the cost of higher
bandwidth and storage requirements).
We present our secondary contribution through the lens of a crowd monitoring system based
on WiFi signals. Anonymizing MAC addresses from WiFi probe requests (PRs) [4, Fig. 4-52] is
indeed required in networks of sensors used for crowd monitoring [5–7], [8, Sec. 7]. Our scheme
prevents user tracking and time synchronization accuracy is no issue on modern networks.
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The main contribution is general and could be of interest to researchers and engineers
pursuing endeavors other than our secondary contribution.
The authors of [9, Sec. 5] succinctly mentioned using random binary sequences appended to
the MAC addresses prior to hashing (or to replace MAC addresses with tokens, more specifically,
universally unique Identifiers (UUIDs) [10]). Our secondary contribution uses a similar idea,
except that we prepend random sequences a central server partially generates and then shares
with time-synchronized sensors. Each sequence is used simultaneously by all sensors during one
minute, a time after which the server and the sensors erase it. Thus, brute force attacks consist
in recovering a pepper of high entropy instead of MAC addresses, whose entropy is too low to
withstand such attacks [9, 11, 12]. We also split peppers into two parts, with one unknown to
the server.
Section II focuses on the main contribution, which lays the foundations for a theoretical
validation of our secondary contribution, which Section III presents.
II Expected number of collisions with uniformly distributed
identifiers
Variable m denotes a number of possible outputs, such that log2(m) ∈ N, and {0, 1}γ denotes
the set of all binary sequences of γ bits. We consider a function h : X → {0, 1}log2(m) (with
n := card(X )). Hereafter, h is either a hash function or a token generator, whose output is
approximately uniformly distributed in {0, 1}log2(m) [2, Sec. 9.7.1].
Following standard terminology in the study of hash tables, we refer to m and n as the
number of buckets and the number of inserts, respectively. Similarly, α := n/m is called the
load factor. Finally, Y (n,m) denotes the (random) number of collisions when inserting n values
into m buckets (with the uniform distribution assumption). Theorem 1 provides the exact—yet
numerically unstable—formula of E
[
Y (n,m)
]
. The numerical instability appears for sufficiently
high values of m.
Theorem 1. For n inserts into m buckets, the collision rate, E[Y (n,m)]/n, is
E
[
Y (n,m)
]
n
= 1− m
n
(
1−
(
m− 1
m
)n)
, (1)
where the uniform distribution assumption has been used.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Theorem 2 proposes three approximations of E[Y (n,m)]/n.
Theorem 2. For a degree of approximation K ≥ 2, a number of inserts n ≥ 2, and a load
factor α ≤ 1, there exist error terms δ(α, n) and RK−1(α) such that
E
[
Y (n,m)
]
n
= 1− α−1 (1− exp(−α)) + δ(α, n) (2)
=
K−1∑
k=1
αk(−1)k+1
(k + 1)!
+ δ(α, n) +RK−1(α) (3)
=
α
2
+ δ(α, n) +R2(α), (4)
where
−
√
α2
n2 − α2
(
pi2
6
− 1
)
≤ δ(α, n) ≤ 0, (5)
2
|RK−1(α)| ≤ α
K
(K + 1)!
, (6)
and, in particular,
|R1(α)|
α/2
≤ α
3
. (7)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Equation (2) yields a first approximation that is not numerically stable for low values of α.
Equation (3) provides a numerically stable approximation whose precision is controlled through
K.
The error term δ(α, n) quantifies to what extent (1− α/n)n accurately approximates exp(−α)
(in particular, limn→∞(1 − α/n)n = exp(−α)). The term RK−1(α) bounds the error tied to
approximating exp(−α) using its Kth-order Taylor polynomial.
For low values of α (e.g., α ≤ 10−3), (4) is an accurate approximation because |R1(10−3)|/(10−3/2) ≤
10−3/3 (see (7)), i.e., the error |R1(α)| is less than 0.1 % of the approximated value α/2. For
α ≤ 1 and for n high enough (say, n ≥ 100), α2/(n2 − α2) ' α2/n2 = 1/m2. Thus, with
m ≥ 264, |δ(α, n)| ≤ m−10.8031 ≤ 5 10−20.
III The probe request anonymization procedure
III.A System overview
We now turn to the anonymization procedure of MAC addresses, whose theoretical validation
relies on Theorem 2. As depicted in Figure 1, we designed a system i) comprising several time-
synchronized WiFi sensors collecting PRs in their respective locations and ii) a central server
collecting as well as processing PRs. The sensors may have overlapping ranges; thus, in order
to detect identical PRs, sensors must generate source address (SA) identifiers that are identical
for a given MAC address and time instant. Within the framework of crowd monitoring, the
central server computes the rate at which PRs are sent (over time frames of one minute) and
then derives an estimate of the number of people in the area covered [6].
There are four requirements our system should meet; SA identifiers should i) be identical
across all sensors at any time instant, ii) not allow anyone to recover the original MAC address
from the corresponding identifier alone, iii) not allow tracking for more than one minute, and
iv) have a collision rate of less than 10−9 for 107 MAC addresses per time frame. (A collision
is defined as two SAs being mapped onto the same SA identifier.) The fourth point means that
the collision rate remains negligible for up to 107 WiFi devices.
Requirements ii) and iii) guarantee privacy. Requirements i) and iv) enable the central
server to compute accurate attendee counts. Should Requirement i) not be met, sensors would
return different SA identifiers for identical devices simultaneously detected (because of overlap-
ping detection ranges), thereby inducing a positive counting bias. Requirement iv) ensures a
negligible probability of two devices being identified as a single one (which creates a negative
counting bias).
We use the SHA-256 hash function in conjunction with a pepper and truncate its ouput to
64 bits. Thus, h : X → {0, 1}64 is a truncated SHA-256 hash function whose inputs are 48-bit
MAC addresses (X = {0, 1}48). On the server, we could also generate uniformly distributed
identifiers from the hashed identifiers; in this case, the server waits a while until all PRs for a
given time frame have been transmitted.
We prepend a time-varying pepper to every MAC address before hashing it. With + denoting
the concatenation operation, and mac address and global pepper representing respectively the
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Figure 1: Scheme of the sensing procedure. Three WiFi sensors with overlapping ranges detect
WiFi probe requests emitted by the smartphones of individuals. The shaded ellipses and the
associated cones depict sensor detection ranges. Each sensor uses HTTPS links to periodi-
cally retrieve server peppers from the central server and uses another HTTPS link to upload
anonymized source address identifiers. Time synchronization is achieved by calibration with
network time protocol (NTP) servers. Communication links are depicted for only one sensor,
to avoid clutter.
MAC address to be anonymized and the pepper prepended, h(global pepper + mac address)
generates the SA identifier. As shown in Figure 2, sensors collect a timestamp, a received signal
strength indicator (RSSI), and a source address (the MAC address).
The pepper consists in a concatenation of a fixed 128-bit sensor pepper and a time-varying
128-bit server pepper. The central server maintains an up-to-date array of 20 server peppers for
a duration of 20 minutes that sensors periodically fetch using an HTTPS link with transport
security layer (TLS). Sensors use each server pepper for a specific one-minute time frame. Server
peppers are generated using a pseudo random number generator (PRNG) (e.g., /dev/urandom
or /dev/random on Linux). If this PRNG is deemed not secure (see [13]), hardware PRNG
generators are alternatives too [14, 15]. We can also generate a specific set of peppers for each
cluster of sensors.
The server and the sensors delete server peppers once they become outdated—in particular,
the sensors erase the volatile memory chunk storing server peppers before updating it with new
peppers retrieved from the server.
The fixed sensor pepper forms a last line of defense in case the server peppers get compro-
mised. It is written in a file or in the codebase of the sniffer, and it is never stored on the server.
We proposed a fixed sensor pepper but storing in advance sensor peppers for time frames of one
minute is possible too; for instance, it represents 42 MB of data for five years.
Let us now prove that our four requirements are met.
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Figure 2: Scheme of the anonymization procedure executed by sensors.
III.B Requirement 1: peppers are identical across all sensors at a given time
instant
This requirement depends on the accuracy of time synchronization. We propose to use network
time protocol (NTP), which implies accurate time synchronization on low-latency networks (e.g.,
4G networks with timing errors lower than 10 ms [16]). There could be synchronization-related
mismatches at the frontiers of consecutive one-minute time frames but only for 20 ms/60000
ms = 0.033 % of their duration.
III.C Requirement 2: impossibility to recover the original MAC address
from anonymous identifiers
Cryptographic hash functions like SHA-256 cannot be directly reversed—in practice, reversing
consists in trying many of the possible inputs until finding one whose hash is the output to
be reversed. Assuming an attacker knows the input MAC address of a particular entry in
the list of PRBs, brute forcing the pepper entails testing many of the 256-bit sequences that
exist (on average, half of them should be tested). For example, 1 million Nvidia RTX 2080
SUPER Founders Edition graphics cards can compute roughly 5700 SHA-256 TeraHashes per
second [17]—this implies that testing all 256-bit peppers (approximately 1.16 1065 TeraHashes)
takes 2.04 1061 seconds, i.e., 6.47 1053 years. Should one of the two 128-bit peppers be known
to an attacker, testing all 128-bit sequences still takes roughly 1.90 1015 years. We point
out that relying on a regular SHA-256 hash function without peppers is not safe (see [9, 12]
and [11, Sec. VI]) as the entropy of MAC addresses is too low to resist brute force attacks.
Moreover, using computationally intensive hashes like bcrypt [18] and Argon2 [19] would imply
unreasonable computational requirements for sensors (see also [9, Sec. 5])
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III.D Requirement 3: preventing tracking for more than one minute
This requirement is linked to server peppers being updated between consecutive time frames of
one minute (as mentioned in Section III.A). In particular, the avalanche effect of SHA-256 hash
functions makes hashing with different peppers return incomparable SA identifiers for a given
MAC address.
III.E Requirement 4: a collision rate of less than 10−9 for 107 MAC addresses
We have m = 264 ' 1.84 1019, which means that we truncate SHA-256 hashes to 64 bits. This
corresponds to a load factor α = 107(1.84)−110−19 ' 10−12 for n = 107 MAC addresses. As
shown in the paragraph below, it yields a collision rate of about 10−12.5, and it makes computer
implementations of the system straightforward (most of the databases on the market support
64-bit integer/BIGINT fields).
Figure 3 shows that the collision rate is approximately equal to 10−12.5. For α sufficiently
low, (e.g., α ≤ 10−3), the approximation becomes (4), which explains why the level sets in
Figure 3 appear to be linear slopes.
Note that approximation errors are negligible. Our load factor α ' 10−12 implies (for
K ≥ 2) |RK−1(α)| ≤ 10−24. Moreover, as already pointed out in our comment of Theorem 2,
for m ≥ 264, |δ(α, n)| ≤ 5 10−20.
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Figure 3: Levels sets of the approximation (3) of the collision rate as a function of the number
of inserts n and the number of buckets m.
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Appendix: Proofs
.A Proof of Theorem 1
Let pj denote the probability the jth (1 ≤ j ≤ m) bucket be empty after n inserts. All inserts
have equal probabilities to fall within each bucket and whether an insert ends up in one bucket is
independent of which buckets are already occupied. As a result, we have pj = ((m− 1)/m)n (n
inserts and, for each insert, a probability (m−1)/m that it ends up in any bucket except the jth
one). The expectation of the number of empty buckets is equal to
∑m
j=1 E[Aj ] = m((m−1)/m)n,
where Aj = 1 if the jth bucket is empty and equals 0 otherwise. Hence, the expectation of the
number of occupied buckets is m − m((m − 1)/m)n. As the number of collisions is equal to
n− “number of occupied bucket”, the proof is complete.
.B Lemmas for Theorem 2
To prove Theorem 2, we shall first derive two lemmas. Lemma 1 quantifies to what extent(
1− α
n
)n
is a good approximation of exp(−α).
Lemma 1. For n ≥ 1 and α < n,(
1− α
n
)n
= exp(−α)F (α, n),
where
exp
(
−α2
√
1
n2 − α2
(
pi2
6
− 1
))
≤ F (α, n) ≤ 1.
Proof. For 0 ≤ α/n < 1, (
1− α
n
)n
= exp
(
n log
(
1− α
n
))
= exp
(
−n
∞∑
k=1
(α/n)k
k
)
= exp
(
−α
(
1 +
∞∑
k=1
(α/n)k
k + 1
))
. (8)
Defining f (K)(α, n) :=
∑K
k=1(α/n)
k/(k + 1), we have, 0 < f (1)(α, n) < f (2)(α, n) < · · · so
that if for all K, f (K)(α, n) ≤ ξ(α, n), ∑∞k=1(α/n)k/(k + 1) ≤ ξ(α, n). The sum in f (K)(α, n)
is the inner product between vectors ((α/n)k)1≤k≤K and (1/(k + 1))1≤k≤K . Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality yields:
f (K)(α, n) ≤
√√√√∥∥∥∥∥
(
αk
nk
)
1≤k≤K
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
∥∥∥∥∥
(
1
k + 1
)
1≤k≤K
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
.
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We have, using an asymptotic expression for geometric series,∥∥∥∥∥
(
αk
nk
)
1≤k≤K
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
=
K∑
k=1
((α
n
)k)2
=
K∑
k=0
((α
n
)2)k − 1
≤
∞∑
k=0
((α
n
)2)k − 1
=
1
1− α2/n2 − 1
=
α2
n2 − α2 .
Moreover, ∥∥∥∥∥
(
1
k + 1
)
1≤k≤K
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
=
K+1∑
k=1
1
k2
− 1
≤
∞∑
k=1
1
k2
− 1
= ζ(2)− 1,
where ζ(2) is Riemann zeta function evaluated at 2, which is equal to pi2/6. Therefore, the
upper bound ξ(α, n) may be
ξ(α, n) := α
√
1
n2 − α2
√
pi2
6
− 1. (9)
Injecting these results in (8) as well as noticing that
∑∞
k=1(α/n)
k/(k + 1) ≥ 0 conclude the
proof.
We now turn to a lemma focusing on the accuracy of a polynomial approximation of α−1(1−
exp(−α)).
Lemma 2. For 0 < α < 1, K ≥ 1 and g : [0, 1] ⊂ R→ [0,∞) : α 7→ g(α) = α−1(1− exp(−α)),
g(α) =
K−1∑
k=0
αk
(k + 1)!
(−1)k +RK−1(α)
where
|RK−1(α)| ≤ α
K
(K + 1)!
Proof. With `(α) := 1− exp(−α), it is easy to compute that
d`
dα
(x) = (−1)k+1 exp(−x).
Thus,
max
x∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣ d`dα(x)
∣∣∣∣ = 1.
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Taylor’s theorem [20, Theorem 5.15] shows that the Kth-order Taylor polynomial of `(α) around
zero has a remainder R′K(α), for which |R′K(α)| ≤ αK+1/(K+ 1)!. The desired (K− 1)th-order
polynomial approximation is:
α−1(1− exp(−α)) = α−1
(
1−
K∑
k=0
αk
k!
(−1)k
)
=
K−1∑
k=0
αk
(k + 1)!
(−1)k,
and the (K−1)th-order remainder is RK−1(α) = α−1R′K(α) and satisfies |RK−1(α)| ≤ αK/(K+
1)!.
.C Proof of Theorem 2
With α = n/m, Theorem 1 and Lemma 1, we derive
E
[
Y (n,m)
]
n
= 1− m
n
(
1−
(
m− 1
m
)n)
= 1− α−1 (1− (1− α/n)n)
= 1− α−1 (1− exp(−α)F (α, n))
For n ≥ 2 and α < 1, α2
√
1
n2 − α2
pi2 − 1
6
is monotonically decreasing with n and monotonically
increasing with α, and it is approximately equal to 0.4637 < 1 for n = 2 and α = 1. Hence, for
n ≥ 2, 1− x ≤ exp(−x) (for x < 1) and(
1− α2
√
1
n2 − α2
(
pi2
6
− 1
))
≤ F (α, n) ≤ 1.
Therefore,
θ(α, n) ≤ E
[
Y (n,m)
]
n
− (1− α−1 (1− exp(−α))) ≤ 1,
where, for α ∈ [0, 1],
θ(α, n) := −α−1 exp(−α)α2
√
1
n2 − α2
(
pi2
6
− 1
)
≥ −
√
α2
n2 − α2
(
pi2
6
− 1
)
because − exp(−α) ≥ − exp(0) = −1 for α ∈ [0, 1]. Equation (2) of Theorem 2 is now proven.
Lemma 2 implies
1− α−1 (1− exp(−α)) = 1−
K−1∑
k=0
αk
(k + 1)!
(−1)k +RK−1(α)
=
K−1∑
k=1
αk
(k + 1)!
(−1)k+1 +RK−1(α),
which proves (3). Deriving (4) and (7) is straightforward.
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